CiceroЦицерон

When Socrates was asked to what country he belonged, he said "that he was a citizen of the world." For he thought himself an inhabitant and citizen of the whole universe.

Socrates quidem cum rogaretur, cuiatem se esse diceret, 'mundanum' inquit; totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur.

Socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he belonged to, replied, "The world;" for he looked upon himself as a citizen and inhabitant of the whole world.

… ita, quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, caeleste et divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est.

Whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has understanding, and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and divine, and on that account must necessarily be eternal; …

… sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non vides, tamen, ut deum adgnoscis ex operibus eius, sic ex memoria rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omnique pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis adgnoscito.

Thus, though you see not the soul of man, as you see not the Deity, yet, as by the contemplation of his works you are led to acknowledge a God, so you must own the divine power of the soul, from its remembering things, from its invention, from the quickness of its motion, and from all the beauty of virtue.

… non esse te mortalem, sed corpus hoc; nec enim tu is es, quem forma ista declarat, sed mens cuiusque is est quisque, non ea figura, quae digito demonstrari potest.

Deum te igitur scito esse, si quidem est deus, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus, cui praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus, …

… consider your body only, not yourself, as mortal. For it is not your outward form which constitutes your being, but your mind; not that substance which is palpable to the senses, but your spiritual nature.

It was absolutely necessaiy that some term, …

… as it is with the fruits of trees, and of the earth, seasons should be allowed for their …

… and at last to drop. This wise men wdl submit to, …

Sed tamen necesse fuit esse aliquid extremum et, tamquam in arborum bacis terraeque fructibus maturitate tempestiva quasi vietum et caducum, quod ferundum est molliter sapienti.

But after all some "last" was inevitable, just as to the berries of a tree and the fruits of the earth there comes in the fulness of time a period of decay and fall.

A wise man will not make a grievance of this.

Quanquam omnia alia incerta sunt, caduca, mobilia: …

… virtue alone is fixed with deep roots; it can neither be destroyed by any violence or moved from its place.

Nam cum alia omnia falsa, incerta sint, caduca, mobilia, virtus est una altissimis defixa radicibus; quae numquam vi ulla labefactari potest, numquam demoveri loco.

Although all other things are uncertain, fleeting, transitory; virtue alone is planted firm with very deep roots; it can not be undermined by any violence; it can never be moved from its position.

… mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multo obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit tamquam alienae domi, quam qualis, cum exierit et in liberum caelum quasi domum suam venerit.

For my own part, when I reflect on the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more perplexing and obscure question to determine what is its character while it is in the body--a place which, as it were, does not belong to it--than to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at the free æther, which is, if I may so say, its proper, its own habitation.

… in alio vero libro, in quo breviter comprehensis gravissimis sententiis quasi oracula edidisse sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis …

… quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae …

But in another book, in which he utters opinions of the greatest weight in a concise form of words, and in which he is said to have delivered oracles of wisdom, he writes in those words which you are well acquainted with, 0 Torquatus.

… because they are sentiments of the greatest gravity intended to guide men to a happy life, and enunciated with suitable brevity.

Quis autem negabit feriri quibusdam praeceptis efficaciter etiam inperitissimos? velut his brevissimis vocibus, sed multum habentibus ponderis: …

For it was reason derived from the nature of things, impelling man to what is right, and deterring him from what is wrong, which does not then begin to be law, when it is found written down in books, but was so from the first moment of its existence.

It was co-eternal with the divine mind, vv^herefore true and ultimate law fitted to order and to forbid is the mind of the supreme being.

Erat enim ratio, profecta a rerum natura, et ad recte faciendum inpellens et a delicto avocans, quae non tum denique incipit lex esse quom scripta est, sed tum quom orta est.

Orta autem est simul cum mente divina.

Quam ob rem lex vera atque princeps, apta ad iubendum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Iovis.

… and which does not begin for the first time to be a law when it is drawn up in writing, but from the first moment that it exists.

And this existence of moral obligation is coeternal with that of the divine mind.

Therefore, the true and supreme law, whose commands and prohibitions are equally authoritative, is the right reason of the Sovereign Jupiter.

Ибо заповедь сия, которую я заповедую тебе сегодня, не недоступна для тебя и не далека; …

… она не на небе, чтобы можно ''было'' говорить: «кто взошел бы для нас на небо и принес бы ее нам, и дал бы нам услышать ее, и мы исполнили бы ее?»

… но весьма близко к тебе слово сие: ''оно'' в устах твоих и в сердце твоем, чтобы исполнять его.

Peace is pleasant, and most profitable; …

… to be resisted not only by war, but even by death.

Et nomen pacis dulce est et ipsa res salutaris, sed inter pacem et servitutem plurimum interest.

Pax est tranquilla libertas, servitus postremum malorum omnium non modo bello, sed morte etiam repellendum.

The name of peace is sweet, the thing itself is most salutary. But between peace and slavery there is a wide difference.

Peace is liberty in tranquillity; slavery is the worst of all evils,—to be repelled, if need be, not only by war, but even by death.

There is nothing more abommable than disgrace, nothing more base than slavery. We have been born for the enjoyment of honour and liberty; let us either retain these or die with dignity.

Nihil est detestabilius dedecore, nihil foedius servitute.

Ad decus et ad libertatem nati sumus; aut haec teneamus aut cum dignitate moriamur.

There is nothing more detestable than disgrace; nothing more shameful than slavery. We have been born to glory and to liberty; let us either preserve them or die with dignity.

Perspicuitas enim argumentatione elevatur.

The clearest subjects are often obscured by lengthened reasoning.

Nam ego neque in causis, si quid est evidens, de quo inter omnis conveniat, argumentari soleo …

… perspicuitas enim argumentatione elevatur …

… for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the clearest matters; …

There is a sufficient recompense in the very consciousness of a noble deed.

Etsi enim satis in ipsa conscientia pulcherrimi facti fructus erat, tamen mortali immortalitatem non arbitror esse contemnendam.

For although in the very consciousness of a glorious action there is a certain reward, still I do not consider immortality of glory a thing to be despised by one who is himself mortal.

Who therefore lives as he wishes, but the man who leads an upright life, who rejoices in the performance of his duty, who has considered well and thoughtfully the path of life he ought to pursue?

… who does not submit to the laws from fear, but pays …

… respect and obedience to them because he considers that this is the most proper course; …

… nor is there anything which has more authority with him than …

Quid est enim libertas? Potestas vivendi, ut velis.

Quis igitur vivit, ut volt, nisi qui recte vivit? qui gaudet officio, cui vivendi via considerata atque provisa est, qui ne legibus quidem propter metum paret, sed eas sequitur et colit, quia id salutare esse maxime iudicat, …

… nec est ulla res, quae plus apud eum polleat quam ipsius voluntas atque iudicium; …

For what is liberty? The power of living as you please.

… the man who obeys the laws of his country, not out of dread, …

… the man who is swayed by nothing so much as by his own inclination and judgment ; …

… nam si supremus ille dies non extinctionem, sed commutationem adfert loci, quid optabilius?

… sin autem perimit ac delet omnino, quid melius quam in mediis vitae laboribus obdormiscere et ita coniventem somno consopiri sempiterno?

For if that last day does not occasion an entire extinction, but a change of abode only, what can be more desirable?

And if it, on the other hand, destroys, and absolutely puts an end to us, what can be preferable to the having a deep sleep fall on us, in the midst of the fatigues of life, and being thus overtaken, to sleep to eternity?

'Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest; nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, nihil ne aut umidum quidem aut flabile aut igneum.

… his enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriae, mentis, cogitationis habeat, quod et praeterita teneat et futura provideat et complecti possit praesentia. quae sola divina sunt, nec invenietur umquam, unde ad hominem venire possint nisi a deo.

… ita, quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, caeleste et divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est.

… nec vero deus ipse, qui intellegitur a nobis, alio modo intellegi potest nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens ipsaque praedita motu sempiterno. hoc e genere atque eadem e natura est humana mens.'

The origin of the soul of man is not to be found upon earth, for there is nothing in the soul of a mixed or concrete nature, or that has any appearance of being formed or made out of the earth; nothing even humid, or airy, or fiery.

For what is there in natures of that kind which has the power of memory, understanding, or thought? which can recollect the past, foresee the future, and comprehend the present? for these capabilities are confined to divine beings; nor can we discover any source from which men could derive them, but from God.

Whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has understanding, and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and divine, and on that account must necessarily be eternal; …

… nor can God himself, who is known to us, be conceived to be anything else except a soul free and unembarrassed, distinct from all mortal concretion, …

Нельзя найти следов земного происхождения душ. В душах нет ничего составного, ничего, чтò могло бы возникнуть или образоваться на земле; нет ничего сродного с влагой, воздухом или огнем. Ни в воде, ни в воздухе, ни в огне нет ничего такого, чтò обладало бы способностью помнить, понимать, мыслить, удерживать прошлое, заглядывать в будущее и постигать, осмысливать настоящее.

For this cause he imagined that Socrates was called the wisest of men by Apollo, because all wisdom consists in this, not to think that we know what we do not know.

… ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una hommis sapientia, non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat.

And it is on that account that he imagines he was pronounced by Apollo the wisest of all men, because this alone is the whole of wisdom, for a man not to think that he knows what he does not know.

The thirst of desire is never filled nor fully satisfied; those who possess such things are tormented not only with the wish to increase them, but also with the fear of losing them.

Neque enim umquam expletur nec satiatur cupiditatis sitis, neque solum ea qui habent libidine augendi cruciantur, sed etiam amittendi metu.

… for the thirst of cupidity is never filled or satiated. They are tormented not only with the lust of increasing, but with the fear of losing what they have.

At et morbi perniciosiores pluresque sunt animi quam corporis …

But there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and they are of a more dangerous nature; …

Therefore, for many other reasons, the souls of the good appear to me to be divine and everlasting; but chiefly on this account, because the soul of the best and the wisest has such anticipation of the future, that it seems to regard nothing but what is eternal.

… itaque cum multis aliis de causis virorum bonorum mentes divinae mihi atque aeternae videntur esse, tum maxime quod optimi et sapientissimi cuiusque animus ita praesentit in posterum ut nihil nisi sempiternum spectare videatur.

… therefore, while there are many reasons why I think that the souls of good men are divine and undying, this is the greatest argument of all to my mind, that the more virtuous and wise each individual is, the more thoroughly does his mind look forward to the future, so as to seem, in fact, to regard nothing except what is eternal.

… neque me vixisse paenitet, quoniam ita vixi, ut non frustra me natum existimem, ut ex vita ita discedo tamquam ex hospitio, non tamquam e domo. Commorandi enim natura devorsorium nobis, non habitandi dedit.

… nor do I regret having lived, for I have done so in a way that lets me think that I was not born in vain. But I quit life as I would an inn, not as I would a home. For nature has given us a place of entertainment, not of residence.

Quod si in hoc erro, qui animos hominum inmortalis esse credam, libenter erro; nec mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo …

But if I am wrong in thinking the human soul immortal, I am glad to be wrong; nor will I allow the mistake which gives me so much pleasure to be wrested from me as long as I live.

Ergo item iustitia nihil expetit praemii, nihil pretii: per se igitur expetitur eademque omnium uirtutum causa atque sententia est.

Atque etiam si emolumentis, non <sua> sponte uirtus expetitur, una erit uirtus quae malitia rectissime dicetur.

… est quidem uera lei recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnis, constans, sempiterna, quae uocet ad officium iubendo, uetando a fraude deterreat, …

… nec erit alia lex Romae alia Athenis, alia nunc alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et inmutabilis continebit unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus: ille legis huius inuentor disceptator lator, cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas ( poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia quae putantur effugerit.

True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil.

It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils which are usually accounted punishments.

Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy from heaven, introducing it into the abodes of men …

… the science of life, of human morals, and the effects of …

Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus etiam introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere.

But Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil.

… he will always both think and act in a …

Nam qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid se habere sentiet diuinum ingeniumque in se suum sicut simulacrum aliquod dicatum putabit, tantoque munere deorum semper dignum aliquid et faciet et sentiet, …

For whoever is acquainted with his own mind, will, in the first place, feel that he has a divine principle within him, and will regard his rational faculties as something sacred and holy …

… worthy of so great a gift of the gods …

For who can either love him whom he fears, or him by whom he thinks that he is feared?

Quis enim aut eum diligat quem metuat, aut eum a quo se metui putet?

Who can love one whom he fears, or by whom he knows that he is feared?