Baruch SpinozaБенедикт Спиноза
7 passagesотрывков: 7
Each date opens its day beside the list, with these passages marked.Каждая дата открывает свой день рядом со списком, где отрывки этого автора отмечены.
2. Откуда все бедствия и душевные муки? Только от привязанности души к таким вещам, постоянное обладание которыми невозможно, так как они подлежат бесконечным изменениям. Люди ведь боятся и страдают только за любимые ими предметы, и все оскорбления, подозрения, вражды — все только от этой любви к предметам, которыми человек никогда не может обладать вполне.
Только любовь к предмету вечному и бесконечному дает нашей душе чистую радость; и вот к этому-то благу мы и должны стремиться всеми силами.
И потому высшее благо человека не только зависит от познания бога, но и вполне в нем заключается. Что это так, ясно из того, что совершенство человека возрастает по степени совершенства того предмета, который он любит больше всех других, и обратно. И потому ясно, что человек тем более будет совершенен и причастен к высшему блаженству, чем более он будет любить совершеннейшее существо, т. е. бога, и чем более будет отдаваться этой любви. Потому и наше высшее благо и основа нашего блаженства — только в познании бога и в любви к нему.
Раз это признано, то очевидно, что средство достижения этой конечной цели человеческих стремлений могут и должны быть признаны заповедями божиими, так как пользование этими средствами предписывается нам самим богом, поскольку он существует в нашей душе. А потому и правила поведения, ведущие к этой цели, могут быть названы божескими заповедями или божественным законом. Божественный же закон весь вполне заключается в одной высшей заповеди: любить бога как высшее благо, т. е. не из страха наказания и не из любви к другому предмету, а так, чтобы любовь к нему была конечной целью, к которой были бы направлены все наши поступки.
Плотской человек не понимает этого, правило это представляется ему пустым, потому что он о боге имеет только несовершенное понятие и не видит в том высшем благе, которое ему предлагается, ничего осязательного, ничего приятного для чувств, ничего удовлетворяющего тело, источник его наслаждений, так как предлагаемое ему благо заключается только в отвлеченном мышлении, в разуме. Но те люди, которые способны понять, что в человеке нет ничего выше разума и совершеннее чистой души, без сомнения, не могут так думать.
Если же мы рассмотрим внимательно сущность этого божественного закона, то мы увидим, во-первых, то, что закон этот всемирен, т. е. общ всем людям, так как он выведен из природы всех людей; во-вторых, что закон этот не нуждается в поддержке посредством каких бы то ни было исторических рассказов; так как выводя закон этот исключительно из природы человека, мы найдем его в душе всякого человека, живущего ли в уединении или среди себе подобных. В-третьих, мы увидим и то, что этот природный божественный закон любви к богу не требует от нас никаких богослужебных обрядов, т. е. такого рода действий, которые, будучи сами по себе безразличны, считаются хорошими только в силу признаваемого всеми предания; так как тот природный свет разума, который живет в нас, не требует от нас ничего такого, чего бы мы не были в состоянии понять и ясно представить себе, как хорошее в самом себе и как средство достигнуть блаженства. В-четвертых, мы увидим, наконец, и то, что наградой за исполнение божественного закона будет самый закон, т. е. знание бога и чистая, свободная и непреходящая любовь к нему. Наказанием же для нарушителей закона будет только лишение этих благ, рабство тела и души, всегда переменчивой и всегда смятенной.
2. Where do all calamities and torments of the soul come from? Only from the soul’s attachment to things that cannot be possessed for good, since they are subject to endless changes. For people fear and suffer only for the objects they love, and all offenses, suspicions, enmities — all come only from this love of objects that man can never wholly possess.
Only love for an object eternal and infinite gives our soul pure joy; and it is this good that we must strive for with all our strength.
And so man’s highest good not only depends on the knowledge of God but lies wholly in it. That this is so is clear from the fact that a man’s perfection grows with the degree of perfection of the object he loves above all others, and conversely. And so it is clear that a man will be the more perfect, and will share the more in the highest blessedness, the more he loves the most perfect being, that is, God, and the more he gives himself up to this love. Therefore our highest good and the ground of our blessedness lie only in the knowledge of God and in love for him.
Once this is recognized, it is evident that the means of attaining this final end of human striving can and must be recognized as commandments of God, since the use of these means is prescribed to us by God himself, inasmuch as he exists in our soul. And so the rules of conduct that lead to this end may be called God’s commandments, or the divine law. And the divine law is wholly contained in one supreme commandment: to love God as the highest good, that is, not from fear of punishment and not from love of any other object, but so that love for him is the final end toward which all our actions are directed.
The carnal man does not understand this; this rule seems empty to him, because he has only an imperfect notion of God and sees in the highest good offered to him nothing tangible, nothing pleasant to the senses, nothing that satisfies the body, the source of his pleasures, since the good offered to him lies only in abstract thought, in reason. But those who are able to understand that there is nothing in man higher than reason and more perfect than a pure soul certainly cannot think so.
And if we examine attentively the essence of this divine law, we shall see, first, that this law is universal, that is, common to all people, since it is derived from the nature of all people; second, that this law has no need of support from any historical narratives whatever, since, deriving this law solely from the nature of man, we shall find it in the soul of every man, whether he lives in solitude or among his fellows. Third, we shall see also that this natural divine law of love for God requires of us no rites of worship, that is, actions of a kind that, being indifferent in themselves, are considered good only by virtue of a tradition acknowledged by all; since the natural light of reason that lives in us requires of us nothing that we are not able to understand and clearly conceive as good in itself and as a means of attaining blessedness. Fourth, and finally, we shall see that the reward for fulfilling the divine law will be the law itself, that is, the knowledge of God and a pure, free, and abiding love for him. And the punishment for those who break the law will be only the loss of these goods, the slavery of the body and of a soul always changeable and always troubled.
From Tractatus theologico-politicus · joined by Tolstoy from several places (more).
Original · Latin… summum nostrum bonum, non tantum a Dei cognitione dependet, sed in eadem omnino consistit : quod etiam ex hoc sequitur, quod homo pro natura, et perfectione rei, quam prae reliquis amat, eo etiam perfectior est, et contra : adeoque ille necessario perfectissimus est, et de summa beatitudine maxime participat, qui Dei, entis nimirum perfectissimi, intellectualem cognitionem supra omnia amat, eâdemque maxime delectatur.
Huc itaque nostrum summum bonum, nostraque beatitudo redit, in cognitionem scilicet et amorem Dei. Media igitur, quae hic finis omnium humanarum actionum, nempe ipse Deus, quatenus ejus idea in nobis est; exigit, jussa Dei vocari possunt, quia quasi ab ipso Deo, quatenus in nostra mente existit, nobis praescribuntur, atque adeo ratio vivendi, quae hunc finem spectat, lex Divina optime vocatur.
Legis igitur divinae summae, ejusque summum praeceptum est, Deum ut summum bonum amare, nempe ut jam diximus, non ex metu alicujus supplicii, et poenae, nec prae amore alterius rei, quâ delectari cupimus : hoc enim idea Dei dictat, Deum summum esse nostrum bonum, sive Dei cognitionem, et amorem, finem esse ultimum, ad quem omnes actiones nostrae sunt dirigendae. Homo tamen carnalis haec intelligere nequit, et ipsi vana videntur, quia nimis jejunam Dei habet cognitionem, et etiam quia in hoc summo bono nihil repperit, quod palpet, comedat, aut denique quod carnem, quâ maxime delectatur, afficiat, utpote, quod in sola speculatione, et pura mente consistit. At ii, qui norunt se nihil intellectu, et sana mente praestantius habere, haec, sine dubio, solidissima judicabunt.
IV. Denique vidimus summum legis divinae praemium esse, ipsam legem, nempe Deum cognoscere, eumque ex vera libertate, et animo integro et constante amare, poenam autem, horum privationem, et carnis servitutem, sive animum inconstantem, et fluctuantem.
Source text: la.wikisource.orgIn English · R. H. M. Elwes, 1883So, then, our highest good not only depends on the knowledge of God, but wholly consists therein; and it further follows that man is perfect or the reverse in proportion to the nature and perfection of the object of his special desire; hence the most perfect and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he who prizes above all else, and takes especial delight in, the intellectual knowledge of God, the most perfect Being.
Hither, then, our highest good and our highest blessedness aim - namely, to the knowledge and love of God; therefore the means demanded by this aim of all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea of him is in us, may be called the commands of God, because they proceed, as it were, from God Himself, inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and the plan of life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the law of God.
The worldling cannot understand these things, they appear foolishness to him, because he has too meager a knowledge of God, and also because in this highest good he can discover nothing which he can handle or eat, or which affects the fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly delights, for it consists solely in thought and the pure reason.
IV. Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the law itself, namely, to know God and to love Him of our free choice, and with an undivided and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the absence of these things, and being in bondage to the flesh - that is, having an inconstant and wavering spirit.
Source text: gutenberg.orgRelated · Ethica, Part V, Proposition 20, ScholiumDeinde notandum animi aegritudines et infortunia potissimum originem trahere ex nimio amore erga rem, quae multis variationibus est obnoxia, et cujus nunquam compotes esse possumus.
Nam nemo de re ulla, nisi quam amat, sollicitus anxiusve est; neque injuriae, suspiciones, inimicitiae, …
… nisi ex amore erga res, quarum nemo potest revera esse compos.
Source text: archive.orgDetails
The words shown were found, word for word, in the saved source text. Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670), ch. IV; Ethica (1677), Part V, Proposition 20, Scholium; Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (1677), § 10, TTP ch. IV, from "atque adeo tota nostra cognitio" to the four properties of the divine law (Elwes's sentences 29–48); Ethics V, prop. 20, schol.; TIE § 10.
Joined from three works. Paragraph 1 is the Scholium to Ethics V, prop. 20 (the related block). Paragraph 2 is On the Improvement of the Understanding, § 10: "Sed amor erga rem aeternam et infinitam sola laetitia pascit animum, ipsaque omnis tristitiae est expers ; quod valde est desiderandum totisque viribus quaerendum." (sources/spinoza-latin-wikisource/tie.html; Elwes: "But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness, wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our strength.", sources/spinoza-tie-elwes/pg1016.txt). Paragraphs 3 to 6 follow the Theological-Political Treatise, ch. IV, in order, with cuts. Changes: in paragraph 1 Spinoza's "chiefly" (potissimum) becomes «только» (only), "many variations" (multis variationibus) becomes «бесконечным изменениям» (endless changes), and the statement becomes a question and its answer. In paragraph 2 love of the eternal "feeds the mind with joy alone, and is itself free of all sadness"; Tolstoy: «дает нашей душе чистую радость» (gives our soul pure joy). In paragraph 3 Spinoza's most perfect man is he who "loves above all the intellectual knowledge of God, the most perfect being" (qui Dei, entis nimirum perfectissimi, intellectualem cognitionem supra omnia amat); Tolstoy's is he who «будет любить совершеннейшее существо, т. е. бога» (will love the most perfect being, that is, God): the love of God takes the place of the love of the knowledge of God. In paragraph 4 the means "can be called commands of God" (jussa Dei vocari possunt) becomes «могут и должны быть признаны заповедями божиими» (can and must be recognized as God's commandments), and "the knowledge and love of God is the ultimate end" becomes «чтобы любовь к нему была конечной целью» (that love of him be the final end). Spinoza's mind (mens) is «душа» (soul): "quatenus in nostra mente existit" becomes «поскольку он существует в нашей душе». In paragraph 5 those who know they have nothing better than intellect and a sound mind "will judge these things most solid" (solidissima judicabunt); Tolstoy: «не могут так думать» (cannot think so). In paragraph 6 Tolstoy leaves out Adam from the second property ("we can conceive it equally in Adam as in any other man") and Spinoza's remarks on the use of histories, and renders "the bondage of the flesh, that is, an inconstant and wavering mind" (carnis servitutem, sive animum inconstantem, et fluctuantem) as «рабство тела и души, всегда переменчивой и всегда смятенной» (the bondage of body and soul, ever changeable and ever troubled). The rest is close. Tolstoy's diary, as the Jubilee vol. 42 commentary quotes it: «Спинозу прочел и выбрал» (11 December 1904) and «вписал Спинозу» (22 December). The edition or translation he read is not named. Elwes's English of the Ethics passage is in sources/spinoza-ethics-elwes/pg3800.txt.
6. Кто истинно любит бога, тот не будет стремиться к тому, чтобы бог любил его. Ему достаточно самому любить бога.
6. Whoever truly loves God will not strive to have God love him. It is enough for him that he himself loves God.
From Ethica · reworded by Tolstoy (more).
What changedAdds “truly” to “He, who loves God,” and a sentence with no counterpart in the proposition: “It is enough for him that he himself loves God.”
Original · LatinQui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amet.
Source text: la.wikisource.orgIn English · R. H. M. Elwes, 1883He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return.
Source text: gutenberg.orgRelated · Goethe, Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit, Part III, Book 14Jenes wunderliche Wort: »Wer Gott recht liebt, muß nicht verlangen, daß Gott ihn wieder liebe«, mit allen den Vordersätzen, worauf es ruht, mit allen den Folgen, die daraus entspringen, erfüllte mein ganzes Nachdenken.
Source text: zeno.orgDetails
The words shown were found, word for word, in the saved source text. Ethica (1677), Part V, Proposition 19, Ethics V, prop. 19 (Latin Wikisource, from Appuhn's edition of 1913); Elwes, Part V, Prop. XIX.
Spinoza's proposition, with a word and a sentence added. Spinoza: “He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return” (Qui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amet); Tolstoy: «Кто истинно любит бога, тот не будет стремиться к тому, чтобы бог любил его» (he who truly loves God will not strive that God love him), and then «Ему достаточно самому любить бога» (it is enough for him himself to love God), which has no counterpart in the proposition or its demonstration (which argues that such a striving would be a wish that God be not God, and so a wish for pain). The added «истинно» (truly) matches the «recht» (rightly) of Goethe's paraphrase in Dichtung und Wahrheit (related block), “Wer Gott recht liebt, muß nicht verlangen, daß Gott ihn wieder liebe” (he who loves God rightly must not ask that God love him in return); whether Tolstoy knew the line through Goethe is not known.
5. Двумя способами представляем мы себе предметы действительно существующими: или поскольку мы их наблюдаем в их соотношении с известным местом и временем, или поскольку мы думаем, что они содержатся в боге и вытекают из необходимости божественной природы. Такими предметами мы признаем всё духовное.
5. We conceive of things as actually existing in two ways: either insofar as we observe them in their relation to a certain place and time, or insofar as we think that they are contained in God and follow from the necessity of the divine nature. Everything spiritual we recognize as things of this kind.
From Ethica · reworded by Tolstoy (more).
What changedSpinoza’s second sentence, that what we conceive in the second way we conceive “under the form of eternity,” gives way to one with no counterpart in the scholium: “Everything spiritual we recognize as things of this kind.”
Original · LatinRes duobus modis a nobis ut actuales concipiuntur : vel quatenus easdem cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum existere, vel quatenus ipsas in Deo contineri, et ex naturæ divinæ necessitate consequi concipimus.
Quæ autem hoc secundo modo ut veræ seu reales concipiuntur, eas sub æternitatis specie concipimus, et earum ideæ æternam et infinitam Dei essentiam involvunt, ut Propositione 45 Partis II ostendimus, cujus etiam Scholium vide.
Source text: la.wikisource.orgIn English · R. H. M. Elwes, 1883Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature.
Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and note, which see.
Source text: gutenberg.orgDetails
The words shown were found, word for word, in the saved source text. Ethica (1677), Part V, Proposition 29, Scholium, Ethics V, prop. 29, schol. (Latin Wikisource, from Appuhn's edition of 1913); Elwes, Part V, Prop. XXIX, Note.
Spinoza's first sentence, closely, and his second replaced. Kept: things are conceived by us as actual in two ways, either as existing in relation to a certain time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature; Tolstoy writes «наблюдаем» (observe) and «думаем» (think) where Spinoza has “concipimus” (we conceive) for both. Replaced: Spinoza goes on that what we conceive in the second way as true or real we conceive under the form of eternity (sub æternitatis specie), and that their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God; Tolstoy's second sentence is «Такими предметами мы признаем всё духовное» (as such things we recognize all that is spiritual), which has no counterpart in the scholium. Hence the signature «По Спинозе» (after Spinoza). The scholium closes Spinoza's argument that the mind conceives things under the form of eternity only by conceiving the body's essence so. How Tolstoy read Spinoza was not found.
3. Разумный человек думает больше о жизни, чем о смерти.
3. A reasonable man thinks more of life than of death.
From Ethica · reworded by Tolstoy (more).
What changed“A free man” becomes “a reasonable man,” after Spinoza’s own gloss, “one who lives under the guidance of reason,” and thinking of death “least of all things” becomes thinking “more of life than of death.”
Original · LatinHomo liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat; …
Homo liber, hoc est qui ex solo rationis dictamine vivit, mortis metu non ducitur …
… atque adeo nihil minus quam de morte cogitat, sed ejus sapientia vitae est meditatio; …
Source text: archive.orgIn English · R. H. M. Elwes, 1883A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is not led by fear …
Source text: gutenberg.orgDetails
The words shown were found, word for word, in the saved source text. Ethica (1677), Part IV, Proposition 67, Ethics IV, prop. 67 and its demonstration (Latin text ed. G. Gentile, Bari 1915); Elwes, Part IV, Prop. LXVII.
Spinoza's proposition, changed: “a free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life” (Homo liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat; et ejus sapientia non mortis, sed vitae meditatio est). Tolstoy writes «Разумный человек» (the rational man) for “Homo liber” (the free man), using the gloss of Spinoza's demonstration, where the free man is the one “who lives by the dictate of reason alone” (qui ex solo rationis dictamine vivit); and «думает больше о жизни, чем о смерти» (thinks more about life than about death) for “thinks of nothing less than of death”, joining the proposition's two clauses into one comparison. How the line reached Tolstoy was not found. The Gentile scan garbles the proposition's last words, so its second clause is shown from the demonstration.
6. Учение Евангелия содержит простую веру, а именно веру в бога и почитание его или, что то же самое, послушание его закону. Весь же закон его только в одном: любить ближнего. Любить ближнего, как самого себя, значит подчиняться закону и быть счастливым в исполнении закона и, наоборот, презирать и ненавидеть своего ближнего — это значит впасть в возмущение и упорство.
6. The teaching of the Gospel contains a simple faith, namely faith in God and reverence for him, or, what is the same thing, obedience to his law. And his whole law lies in one thing only: to love one’s neighbor. To love one’s neighbor as oneself means to submit to the law and to be happy in fulfilling the law; and, conversely, to despise and hate one’s neighbor — this means to fall into rebellion and obstinacy.
From Tractatus theologico-politicus · shortened by Tolstoy (more).
Original · LatinEuangelica autem doctrina nihil praeter simplicem fidem continet, nempe Deo credere, eumque revereri, sive, quod idem est, Deo obedire.
Deinde quidnam unusquisque exequi debeat, ut Deo obsequatur, ipsa etiam Scriptura plurimis in locis quam clarissime docet, nempe totam legem in hoc solo consistere, in amore scilicet erga proximum; …
… quare nemo etiam negare potest, quod is, qui ex Dei mandato proximum tanquam se ipsum diligit, revera est obediens, et secundum legem beatus, et qui contra odio habet, vel negligit, rebellis est, et contumax.
Source text: la.wikisource.orgIn English · R. H. M. Elwes, 1883The doctrine of the Gospels enjoins nothing but simple faith, namely, to believe in God and to honour Him, which is the same thing as to obey him.
Moreover, the Bible teaches very clearly in a great many passages what everyone ought to do in order to obey God; the whole duty is summed up in love to one's neighbour.
It cannot, therefore, be denied that he who by God's command loves his neighbour as himself is truly obedient and blessed according to the law, whereas he who hates his neighbour or neglects him is rebellious and obstinate.
Source text: gutenberg.orgDetails
The words shown were found, word for word, in the saved source text. Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670), ch. XIV, TTP ch. XIV (Latin Wikisource); Elwes, A Theologico-Political Treatise, ch. XIV, §§ 15–18.
Three sentences of Spinoza's, one between them left out, the rest kept closely with small changes. Left out: that there is no need to heap up the texts of Scripture that commend obedience, and the clause that Scripture teaches what each must do to obey God “very clearly in a great many places”. Changed: “nihil praeter simplicem fidem continet” (contains nothing but simple faith) becomes «содержит простую веру» (contains a simple faith), without “nothing but”; “Deo obedire” (to obey God) becomes «послушание его закону» (obedience to his law); “ex Dei mandato” (by God's command) before loving one's neighbor as oneself is left out; “secundum legem beatus” (blessed according to the law) becomes «быть счастливым в исполнении закона» (to be happy in fulfilling the law); and “odio habet, vel negligit” (hates or neglects) becomes «презирать и ненавидеть» (to despise and hate). Kept: the whole law consists in this one thing, love towards one's neighbor; he who hates his neighbor is rebellious and obstinate («впасть в возмущение и упорство»). How Tolstoy read Spinoza was not found.
5. Нельзя сказать, чтобы для спасения души было безусловно необходимо признавать Христа во плоти; но для спасения души безусловно необходимо признавать сына божия, т. е. ту вечную мудрость божию, которая проявляется во всех вещах и преимущественно в душе человека и более всего проявилась в Иисусе Христе. Без этой мудрости никто не может достигнуть состояния блаженства, потому что она одна указывает, что истинно и что ложно, что добро и что зло.
5. It cannot be said that for the salvation of the soul it is absolutely necessary to acknowledge Christ in the flesh; but for the salvation of the soul it is absolutely necessary to acknowledge the Son of God, that is, that eternal wisdom of God which is manifested in all things, and chiefly in the soul of man, and was manifested most of all in Jesus Christ. Without this wisdom no one can attain the state of blessedness, for it alone shows what is true and what is false, what is good and what is evil.
From Letter to Henry Oldenburg, late 1675 · reworded by Tolstoy (more).
What changedSpinoza’s guarded “the case is far otherwise” becomes “it is absolutely necessary to acknowledge the Son of God,” “to know Christ” becomes “to acknowledge Christ,” and salvation becomes “the salvation of the soul.”
Original · LatinDenique, ut de tertio etiam capite mentem meam clarius aperiam, dico, ad salutem non esse omnino necesse , Christum secundum carnem noscere ; sed de aeterno illo filio Dei, hoc est, Dei aeterna sapientia , quae sese in omnibus rebus, et maxime in mente humana, et omnium maxime in Christo lesu manifestavit, longe aliter sentiendum.
Nam nemo absque hac ad statum beatitudinis potest pervenire , utpote quae sola docet , quid verum et falsum , bonum …
Source text: archive.orgIn English · R. H. M. Elwes, 1884I do not think it necessary for salvation to know Christ according to the flesh : but with regard to the Eternal Son of God, that is the Eternal Wisdom of God, which has manifested itself in all things and especially in the human mind, and above all in Christ Jesus, the case is far other wise.
For without this no one can come to a state of blessedness, inasmuch as it alone teaches, what is true or lalse, good or evil.
Source text: archive.orgDetails
The words shown were found, word for word, in the saved source text. Letter to Henry Oldenburg, late 1675 (Ep. 73 in Van Vloten and Land's numbering), Opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. C. H. Bruder, vol. II (Leipzig, 1844), Ep. XXI, pp. 195–196; Elwes, The Chief Works, vol. II, Letter XXI (LXXIII).
Spinoza's answer to Oldenburg's third question, its two sentences kept with one turn made stronger. Spinoza: “dico, ad salutem non esse omnino necesse, Christum secundum carnem noscere; sed de aeterno illo filio Dei … longe aliter sentiendum” (I say it is not altogether necessary for salvation to know Christ according to the flesh; but of that eternal son of God … one must think far otherwise). Tolstoy: «Нельзя сказать, чтобы для спасения души было безусловно необходимо признавать Христа во плоти; но для спасения души безусловно необходимо признавать сына божия» (one cannot say it is absolutely necessary for the soul's salvation to recognize Christ in the flesh; but for the soul's salvation it is absolutely necessary to recognize the son of God): Spinoza's guarded “far otherwise” becomes “absolutely necessary”, “noscere” (to know) becomes «признавать» (to recognize), and salvation becomes the soul's. Kept: the son of God is God's eternal wisdom, which has shown itself in all things, chiefly in the human mind («в душе человека», in the soul of man), and most of all in Jesus Christ; without it no one can reach the state of blessedness, since it alone teaches what is true and false, good and evil. Tolstoy has the wisdom «проявляется» (shows itself) in all things and «проявилась» (showed itself) in Jesus, where Spinoza has one past tense, “manifestavit”. Bruder's text crosses a page and a footnote after “bonum”, so the second excerpt stops there; its OCR reads “lesu” for “Iesu”. Elwes's English is from the 1898 reprint of his second edition (first edition 1884); its OCR reads “lalse” for “false”. How Tolstoy read Spinoza was not found.
4. Счастье, истинное счастье есть сама добродетель.
4. Happiness, true happiness, is virtue itself.
From Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata · shortened by Tolstoy (more).
Original · LatinPROPOSITIO XLII. Beatitudo non est virtutis praemium, sed ipsa virtus; …
Source text: archive.orgIn English · R. H. M. Elwes, 1883PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; …
Source text: gutenberg.orgDetails
The words shown were found, word for word, in the saved source text. Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata (1677), Part V, Proposition 42, Ethics V, prop. 42 (Latin text ed. G. Gentile, Bari 1915).
The first half of the proposition ("Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself"), reduced to "happiness, true happiness, is virtue itself": the contrast with reward, which is the point, is dropped, and the second half (we do not rejoice in it because we restrain our lusts, but can restrain them because we rejoice in it) is left out. Beatitudo is rendered «счастье», said twice for emphasis.